To a large extent, Stalin’s power base was indeed the most important factor in his rise to power as it acted as a consistent, reliable base that secured his position in the party and through which he was able to enact his policies, which then formed a critical part in his political manoeuvring especially in regards to defeating the left and right opposition. However, we must also acknowledge that the mistakes of the opposition, who frequently underestimated Stalin and failed to use their power base (or lack thereof) did play a significant factor as Stalin was consequently able to exploit these weaknesses to his advantage, further cementing his own power. Crucially, however, were it not for Stalin’s existing power base, the exploitation of his opposition’s mistakes would arguably not be as effective in his rise to power. Stalin’s Powerbase was to a large extent the most important factor in his rise to power, as it was through this consistent, reliable basis of support that Stalin was able to ensure the security of his political position therefore meaning that he could enact the policies he desired, with said policies often being a critical part of his political manoeuvring which allowed him to pivot to the positions most politically beneficial to the cultivation of his power at the time. Stalin’s election to the Orgburo in 1919 and his appointment as General Secretary in April 1922 demonstrates how he was able to cultivate the power base which would consistently support him; the former giving him organisational powers that would prove critical later on, such as for the organisation of Lenin’s funeral on the 27th February 1924, an opportunity which Stalin used to create the image of himself being a close disciple of Lenin and therefore a suitable candidate to succeed him, appealing to a wider base of supporters as a result and increasing his power base; an example of political manoeuvring helped to cultivate his power base in his rise to power. His appointment as general secretary, furthermore, allowed him to appoint individuals in key positions within the party apparatus who would then be loyal to Stalin, meaning that he could build a consistent, reliable base of support that would not oust him. This is most evident through the individuals of Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Molotov and Kirov, whom Stalin would appoint to key positions on the condition of providing their support, allowing him to increase his power base as they consequently appointed individuals to support themselves and by proxy Stalin; this way allowing for Stalin to gain a wide powerbase within the party. It is evident that his powerbases were critical in his rise to power, furthermore, as they protected his position immediately after Lenin’s death; the first triumvirate of himself, Zinoviev and Kamenev critical in that he was able to protect himself from Lenin’s denunciations through Zinoviev and Kamenev’s powerbases in Leningrad and Moscow respectively, showing how powerbases were critical in political manoeuvring. The literary discussion of 1925-26 further demonstrates how his policies were linked to his powerbase; the advocation for Socialism in One Country as clearly seen through Stalin’s On Questions of Leninism allowing himself to increase the strength of his powerbase as he appealed to Russian nationalist sentiment, advocating for advancement and security within Russia herself rather than the economically and socially taxing ideas of permanent revolution. Therefore, Stalin’s powerbase was to a large extent the most important factor in his rise to power as it critically ensured the security of his position within the party, with the policies he advocated forming a key part of political maundering that ensured the expansion of his powerbase, allowing him to, in a cyclical fashion, enforce the policies desired as a result of his increased powerbase. However, the mistakes of the opposition were also critical as it was their indecisiveness, underestimation of Stalin and general impotence in regards to effectively using (or cultivating) a powerbase within the party that allowed Stalin to exploit their impotence as a result and rise to power. For example, Trotsky firstly failed to attend Lenin’s funeral on the 27th of February 1924, immediately raising questions about his suitability as a successor to Lenin, with Stalin crucially exploiting his absence as a means through which he could position himself as a close disciple of Lenin and therefore a suitable successor. Trotsky’s subsequent hesitance to read out Lenin’s last testament at the 13th party congress in May 1924 meant that perhaps the only opportunity to prevent Stalin’s rise to power within the party was squandered, allowing Stalin to form alliances such a s The First Triumvirate and giving him time to negate the effect of the Last testament when it would eventually be revealed, further showing how the mistakes of the opposition lead to the successful rise of Stalin to power. Trotsky’s resignation as commissar for war in January 1925 and the subsequent failure of the United Opposition further confirm Stalin’s success in his rise to power as a result of his opponent’s mistakes; with Zinoviev and Kamenev having successfully decreased the influence of Trotsky, Stalin was able to distance himself from them as seen through the break up of the triumvirate in the 14th party congress in December 1925. The United Opposition’s weak resistance to Stalin was futile as a result of their previous divisions, with Stalin exploiting their desperation in the literary discussion of 1926 which he dominated, subduing their influence and wholly defeating them eventually as seen through the expulsion of Trotsky and Kamenev from the party in December 1927 at the fifteenth party congress. The mistakes of the right opposition also display weakness and futility that Stalin was able to exploit; for example, the forming of the Duumvirate of Bukharin and Stalin immediately after the break up of the first triumvirate indicated a naïveté on Bukharin’s part, who did not realise that Stalin would opportunistically betray him just as he had done to his former allies; such realities becoming evident with the Ural-Siberian method of early 1928 which saw a war communism-esque return to grain requisitioning against the philosophy of NEP that Bukharin advocated; Stalin taking advantage of and exploiting Bukharin’s political impotence to enact such a policy, as evidenced by the futile ‘protest against excesses’ made by Bukharin in response to the Ural-Siberian Method, which saw no support and effectively confirmed Stalin’ power, which was cemented to the point that he was able to enforce The Great Turn, advocating rapid, mass industrialisation in a shift to leftist policies the next year in November and expel Bukharin from key positions in the Pravda in January 1929, marking the end of the Right Opposition. Therefore, the mistakes of the opposition also played a critical role in Stalin’s rise to power as he was able to exploit the weaknesses of his opponents to politically gain more power when it was opportunistically viable; seen through Trotsky’s inability to neutralise the threat of Stalin at the 13th part congress when he was at his weakest, the fickleness of Zinoviev and Kamenev, who sided with Trotsky too late to inflict any real damage and were ultimately defeated in the literary discussion regardless, and the impotence of Bukharin, the right opposition, who found himself alone when needing to oppose Stalin at critical junctures, such as the enforcement of the Ural-Siberian method in early 1928. Therefore, while it was to a large extent Stalin’s Powerbase that was the most important factor in his rise to power, ensuring the security of his political position through he appointment of loyal cadres and ministers, concomitantly used to both enact his policies and therefore aid his political manoeuvring, as well as being expanded through the latter at the same time, the mistakes of the opposition were also critical as they meant that they became weaknesses that Stalin exploited in his rise to power; the indecisiveness of the Left opposition allowing Stalin to ally himself with those who could politically protect him and expand his powerbase (as seen through the Triumvirate and the subsequent Duumvirate) and the impotence of the right opposition allowing him to enforce his policies without regard as they were politically unable to resist, as seen through the Ural-Siberian method of early 1928 returning to grain requisitioning in contrast to NEP and the Great Turn of November 1929 which shifted to leftist, radical measures in the interest of industrialisation. Nonetheless, the powerbase still arguably retains the greater importance in Stalin’s rise to power as without a consistent, reliable base of support through which Stalin’s political position was ensured, his consequent political manoeuvring and enforcement of policy would be impossible.