The view that the Truman doctrine marked the decisive turning point in the development of the Cold War in the years 1949-49 is only a partially valid view. Although the doctrine - which aimed to limit the spread of communist expansion - was key in marking a shift in the relations between the USSR and the US and validating this idea in the eyes of the Soviets that the US was ‘anti-Soviet’ - the actions of the USSR between 1945 to 1949 were more significant, as Stalin and the USSR’s aims of creating a ‘glacis of states’ through obedient, satellite states, was what drove American involvement in Europe. Therefore, the Truman Doctrine did not mark a turning point in relations; instead, it was the foreign policy pursuits of the USSR which marked a shift in diplomatic relations, from cooperation to hostility. Therefore, this view is only partially valid. Firstly, the view that the Truman Doctrine marked the decisive turning point in the development of the Cold War, from the years 1945 to 1949, is only partially valid. This is because the doctrine was already formed by preexisting fears of communist expansionism, and indeed, this doctrine was only the ‘formal result’ of established diplomatic fears. This is because, prior to the Truman doctrine, fears of communist expansion had already risen through the ranks of the American political establishment. In February 1946, Kennan expressed his concern for the aggressive nature of the USSR’s expansion, and he pleaded with Truman to increase the US’ involvement in Europe. This was exacerbated by Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech a month later, in which he argued that the USSR’s expansion was a calculated attempt to create a solidified border between liberal democracy and authoritarianism. Therefore, the doctrine that followed a year later was the result of a variety of concerns from the American elite. Indeed, by the time that the doctrine was announced, it was already clear that the USSR was using their ‘salami tactics’ in order to achieve their broader goal of an eastern European bloc that had greater authority and power than western Europe. Indeed, this was clear by the fact that by the time, contained within Europe at the time was an immense power vacuum. It was this power vacuum which increased tensions between the powers, as this vacuum was something the USSR and US forces fought over, for power and prestige on the world stage. This was significant as it meant that the opposing ideological beliefs of the nations transcended into physical ones, as they competed against each other. This is clearly exemplified by the transition of Poland into a satellite state by January 1947 (just before the formation of the doctrine). This conversion from liberal democracy to communism wasn’t just significant as it expanded the territory of the USSR, but because it showed that the USSR couldn’t be trusted, as this juxtaposed their agreements of a ‘declaration of liberated Europe’ in Yalta, back in 1946. Clearly then, the US felt that it was important to have a greater say within Europe to prevent further communist expansion westwards. Therefore, the doctrine was not the result of a unique epiphany that marked a significant shift in relations, but instead it was the result of preinstalled fears that American diplomats had, making this argument only partially valid. Yet the idea that the Truman doctrine marked a decisive turning point does have some merit because the Truman doctrine created a cascade of policies that worked towards limiting communist ‘expansion’, which ended the era of cooperation and the ‘marriage of convenience’ that went before it. This is because the US used their economic strength to tighten their grasp on Europe after WW2. This can be clearly exemplified by the creation of the Marshall Plan, which was announced by George Marshall in 1947. Over time, it would give 16 countries a total of $13.5 billion in aid. This was significant as it proved immensely powerful in recovering many European economies. Arguably, this was something that many American diplomats were considerate of, as WW2 had left many European countries in ruin. However, this was seen as a threat to the Soviet order, as this was seen as a way of the USA increasing their control over Europe by serving their own economic interests. Indeed, during the Paris conference of July 1947, Molotov (a USSR diplomat) saw this as a form of ‘dollar imperialism’, as aid required increased trade with the US. This was significant as the USSR didn’t perceive this as an act of generosity, but a carefully calculated attempt to increase the capitalist power within Europe by creating a vast amount of vested American interests within European economic, preventing communist expansion. This was significant in it of itself as it was perceived that countries became communist if their economies were weak, as people would be dissatisfied with the capitalist order. This was seen in France for example, where WW2 and Nazi order left them battered. As a result, the PCI communist party in France was the largest party by November 1946, holding 29% of the total seats. Combined, this was incredibly important in undermining the USSR’s power. But, at a time when the US was making 50% of the worlds goods, it was also important in solidifying this idea that the US was serving its own interests, when in reality, they were mutually beneficial, as increased aid to Europe increased their own economic power, but also reduced the power of the USSR at the same time. Therefore, clearly the Truman doctrine, which aimed to limit the spread of communism, was significant in influencing American policies. But nevertheless, it was the policies in it of itself that were more significant in marking a ‘decisive’ shift because ultimately only they had a physical impact on the ground in Europe, therefore making this view only partially valid. Lastly, the idea that the Truman Doctrine marked the decisive turning point in the development of the Cold War in the years 1945–49 is only partially valid because prior to the establishment of the doctrine, tensions between the forces were already established, because their core ideologies proved to be completely at odds with one another. This is because the Truman doctrine was only the result of fears that the USSR was at odds against liberal democracy, which was clearly born out of the leadership style of the communists, and Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’, which marked an era of authoritarian rule of the USSR. This can clearly be seen that Stalin went against the agreed upon ‘declaration of liberated Europe’, which was born out because the west wanted Europe to be a beacon of liberal democracy (shown by FDR’s ‘four freedoms’). Instead, Stalin went against these very agreed upon orders because they weren’t legally binding. For example, Stalin used his ‘salami tactics’ to install Soviet forces within Romania by the end of 1947, as the ‘communist travellers’ in Romania established the communist ‘people’s republic’ of Romania by the 30th of December 1947. This was significant as it reassured the USA that the USSR was intent on creating a ‘glacis of states’ between the west and the east. Therefore, the USA’s actions weren’t just born about because of economic interests, but also by the very core idea of the Truman doctrine: to halt the spread of communism. Indeed, the USSR’s rigging of elections in Poland also verified these fears and showed that the USSR could not be trusted. This extended all the way to Marshall Plan, as those within the ‘iron curtain’, although interested in the Marshall Plan, were not allowed to sign up to it. This persistent authoritarianism didn’t just go against American liberal democracy, but resulted in retaliation from the Americans as they increased their authority within Europe to prevent communist expansion westwards, with, for example, the creation of NATO on the 4th of April 1949. Therefore, US involvement within Europe was born out from the Truman doctrine - which in some ways does show that it was a significant factor in marking a decisive shift in how the USA dealt with Europe. But the USA’s actions in it of itself still superseded the significant of the doctrine, therefore making this view only partially valid. Overall, the view that the Truman doctrine marked a decisive, significant turning point towards the creation of a cold war is only partially valid. Although the Truman doctrine resulted in a labyrinth of policies aimed at halting communist expansion, through economic means, the doctrine in it of itself was already the result of diplomatic fears of the USSR and its attempts to rid Europe of liberal democracy. Furthermore, the actual concrete policy decisions that were born out from these fears were in it of itself more significant as they actually marked a decisive shift on the ground - like, for example, the aid provided, and how the USSR’s foreign policy was shaped (e.g. further satellite state creations), therefore making this view only partially valid.